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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WELDON S. ABBOTT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 17616 
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WELDON S. ABBOTT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS APPELLANT 
GENERAL STATEMENT 
This Appeal involves three (3) separate actions from the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Duchesne, County, wherein Abbott was 
plaintiff in two (2) of them, and Christensen was plaintiff in the 
other. For both convenience and consistency in this Brief, all 
references to these parties shall be either to Abbott or 
Christensen, respectively. 
NATURE OF THE CASES 
Abbott and Christensen had been Partners or Joint Venturers in 
a land-cattle operatiqn in the Uintah Basin, which commenced in the 
Pall Of 1970 -and terminated by the end of December, 1974. The 
Page - 1 -
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three (3) consolidated actions arose from the termination of this 
business relationship. In 1976, Abbott commenced the first action 
to replevy 28 head of cattle, and the second to recover a 
$29 ,000. 00 down payment on a Real Estate Contract. Christensen 
counterclaimed, seeking a consolidation; the appointment of a 
Receiver; an accounting; etc. In April 1977, Abbott removed the 
424 shares of water from the "Reary place", and Christensen 
commenced the third action requesting: the water be left where it 
was; Abbott enter into escrow; Abbott deliver water certificate to 
escrow agent; etc. 
The parties stipulated to: a consolidation of the three casu; 
and the Court appointment of a special master. In substance, these 
actions are in equity. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A. ROLE OF SPECIAL MASTER: 
From January 19, 1977, through Judgment, the special master 
reviewed documents and prepared an accounting. He prepared three 
"tenative" reports or accountings which each party was allowed to 
review, etc. Each report attempted to conform to and fully reflect 
information furnished by the parties. A report was available for 
trial, and was thereafter adjusted to reflect the facts and/or 
conclusions the trial court reached during trial. 
B. TRIAL: 
The consolidated cases were tried on July 9, 10, and 14, 1980• 
1980, the - trial court made and entered it's own On November 2 1 , _ 
Page - 2 - I 
,; 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
c. JUDGMENT 
After the special master's final accounting, and arguments of 
the parties were heard, on February 24, 1981, the Court's Judgment 
was filed, and Christensen was the "prevailing party." 
D. APPEAL: 
Abbott filed Notice of Appeal on March 16, 
Christensen Cross Appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL 
1981, and 
Christensen seeks the affirmation of the report and accounting 
of the special master, and of the Judgment, except to that part of 
the decision that: requires Christensen to pay Abbott a $29,000.00 
down payment on the Lindsay Place; that fails to give Christensen 
credit for $80,000.00 of his contribution; fails to return the mare 
and two colts and account for the Winterton steers; -and, -awa~d a -
reasonable attorneys fee and costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While recognizing the need for brievity, Christensen also 
recognizes that without an adequate history of the joint venture, 
it will be difficult, if not impossible, to understand this 
litigation and/or appeal. Hopefully to assist the court in that 
regard, Christensen offers this detailed account of the facts: 
Page - 3 -
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I. PERIOD PRIOR TO FALL 1974: 
A. BACKGROUND: 
Abbott is and was a medical doctor whose residence and practic: 
is in Salt Lake City. Christensen is and was a resident of Mt, 
Home, Utah. When Christensen first met Abbott, Christensen owned' 
home at Mt. Home, and was employed by the U. S. Government as, 
"Wilderness Ranger". They had a mutual acquaintance in John E. 
"Ringneck" Fausett (Fausett hereafter). 
During the fall of 1970, Abbott indicated to Fausett he wouic 
like to acquire, for tax purposes, a cattle ranch in the Uint:' 
Bas in, if he had someone to run it for him. Fausett offered t: 
help "find" an appropriate person. Fausett arranged a meeting a:. 
his ranch, where he introduced Abbott and Christensen, and assistei 
them in formulating their agreement. 
B. AGREEMENT: 
Abbott and Christensen agreed that: Abbott would supply tn: 
necessary capital to acquire the land, and cattle for a cow-call 
operation~ Christensen would manage the operation for a guarante: 
of $500.00 per month, his beef, a place to live and his utilities: 
and, they would split the annual profits from the calf "crop'. 
Christensen's monthly guarantee of $500.00 was to be deducted fro: 
his share of the profits, if any. Christensen was not to share ii 
the losses and losses were not be be carried from year to year. 
Initially, Christensen was 
or Abbott's real property~ 
to have no interest in the cattle her' 
(See Findings of Fact Jl, Record, p, 
Page - 4 -
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135, Case No. 6169) 
c. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREENENT .:. Reary Place: 
By January 1971, Christensen had negotiated the purchase of the 
"Reary" place, and assisted in the purchase of 60 "mother cows". 
Included in the purchase of the Reary Place was 240 acres of land, 
an older home with out buildings, 424 shares of water in the 
Farnsworth Canal Co., 30 shares of oil, gas and mineral rights 
(Exhibit #35), and certain items of farm equipment (Exhibit lt36). 
By April, Christensen moved his family to the Reary Place and 
started discharging his agreed duties. 
D. BLEAZARD PLACE .:. Expansion of Agreement: 
Shortly after acquiring the Reary Place, an adjoining ranch 
belonging to Grant Bleazard also became available, which Abbott 
desired to acquire. However, Abbott did not have sufficient 
personal funds. Christensen offered to assist by trading to 
Bleazard his home for $10,000.00 and some land and mineral rights 
for $25,000.00. On May 1, 1971, Abbott used Christensen's land and 
minerals as a down payment to acquire the "Bleazard Place", 
consisting of 620 acres, together with certain water shares and 
personal property. (see Exhibit #15). 
As a result of Christensen's contribution, and Abbott's 
interest in acquiring more land, the parties agreed that in 
addition to the cattle operation, Christensen would negotiate the 
purchase of additional properties; Abbott would continue to furnish 
the necessary capital; and, the profits (if any) from the re-sale 
of the ranches would be divided between them. The parties further 
agreed that when the_ joint venture ended, the "Reary Place" would 
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belong to Christensen and the "Bleazard Place" would belong to 
Abbott. However, at no time was a written t ag reemen prepared, 
although Abbott acknowledged that the agreement had "change[d) from 
time to time as our situation changed". [Abbott's deposition, Pg. 
6, lines 5-6; Record Pg. 0062, Case No. 5799]. Christensen claimed 
that only the items being joint ventured changed, and not the basic 
agreement'. 
E. BANK ACCOUNTS - "Ranch Account": 
- Abbott, maintained at least two "Ranch Accounts", each of which 
he treated, at least in part, as his personal account. One of 
these was at Zions First National Bank, at Roosevelt, Utah, on 
which Christensen was approved to sign checks. 
F. CATTLE BRAND: 
The brand, ·W- was registered with the State Brand 
Inspector, in both of their names. Abbott alleged that Christensen 
was included as an owner as a convenience,.~to sell the cattie. 
Ch1:istensen claimed that he was registered as a owner because he 
was an owner of at least part of the cattle with that brand. All 
cattle owned by Abbott or the partnership were branded with this 
brand. 
G. WINTERTON HEIFERS: 
During the first year of the joint venture, the parties 
purchased 1 00+ head of heifers from the Winterton Brothers of 
At Roosevelt, Utah, to be "fed out" and sold in the fall of 1971. 
the time of sale, Abbott elected to retain some of the heifers as 
"mother cows". Christensen claimed that Abbott agreed to 
. . h of the 
compensate Christensen for }'lhat would have been his s are 
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"profits" from the heifers at the rate of $100.00 per head, which 
Abbott denied. 
H. ~ LAND ACQUISITIONS: After the "Reary" and "Bleazard" 
places, the parties commenced to buy other ranches. 
1. Birch !!_ and Birch E: Christensen was negotiating the 
purchase of these properties in 1972, when the owner died. As a 
result, the land was in probate for a time. The required funds 
were to be furnished by Abbott, but when they were needed, Abbott 
did not have the same. Christensen personally borrowed $15,000.00 
at Zions First National Bank, deposited the same to the Ranch 
Account and paid the Birches. Christensen had to repay said 
$15,000.00 from his personal funds. The special master considered 
this contribution in his accounting• These places were acquired in 
Christensen's name, and went to Christensen in the distribution. 
2. Taylor Place: In January of 1973, Abbott purchased an 
adjoining "dry" -ranch- of-160 -acres, -for--$16,000.-00-.-- Sai-d--f.'anch--had~ 
no irrigation or water rights, but was adjacent to both the 
Bleazard and Reary places. It was treated as Abbott's place from 
the beginning. 
3. Lindsay Place: On June 21, 1973, the parties jointly 
purchased a nearby ranch, hereafter referred to as the "Lindsay 
Place (See Exhibit i16). It had 160 acres of land, 49 head of 
cattle, 65 head of sheep, 392 1/2 shares of water, and 
miscellaneous farm equipment. The payments on the Lindsay place 
are covered by the special master. This place went to Christensen 
in the distribution. 
4, Whitehead Place: On April 2, 1974, Christensen personally 
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purchased the Whitehead Ranch, consisting of 240 acres 86 h 
' s ares 
of Dry Gulch Irrigation Water, 34 head of cattle, and miscellaneous 
farm equipment for $105,000.00, with $26,000.00 down. The payments 
are covered by the special master. In the final distribution, this 
place went to Abbott. 
I. ZANE CHRISTENSEN RANCH: On or about June 4, 1974, the parties 
attempted to purchase an additional ranch consisting of 1513 acres, 
plus certain water rights, from Zane Christensen for $681,000.00, 
They were to pay $200,000.00 down, of which they paid $50,000.00 in 
cash and gave a Promissory Note for $150,000.00. The $50,000.00 
came from the "Ranch Account," and the parties entered into 
possession of and "ran" the ranch for the 1974 season. However, 
for numerous reasons, and since the joint venture was breaking up, 
the parties elected not to complete this purchase. Zane did not 
compel specific performance of the parties but he simply forfeited 
the parties interest [Exhibit lt20]. The Court did not consider 
this purchase as part of the Joint Venture. [See Record, Pg. 173, 
Paragraph 1, Case No. 6169] 
J. CHRISTENSEN'S CONTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL: From time to time 
Christensen, either jointly with Abbott or by himself, borrowed 
funds and deposited the same to the ranch accounts. In addition, 
as indicated under sub paragraph "D" above, regarding the Bleazard 
Place, Christensen turned over his home and certain mineral rights 
to Abbott, so Abbott could acquire the Bleazard place. Christensen 
received credit for all of his contributions to the Joint Venture, 
except: 
1. The $10,000.00 f9r his home; 
Page - 8 -
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2. The $25,000.00 for his mineral rights; and 
3. $45,000.00 borrowed from Zions First National Bank and 
deposited to the Ranch Account. 
K. 1973 CALF CROP: In 1973 the price of cattle was severally 
depressed, and rather than sell the entire calf crop and divide the 
profits at that point, the parties elected to retain the best calf 
heifers and sell the rest. From the calves sold, the parties had 
sufficient income to pay their expenses, and the retained heifers 
were their "profit." [See Deposition of Abbott, pg 34, lines 12-
14, found in Record at Pg. 62, Case No. 6169). Originally 58 calf 
heifers were thus retained. Abbott claimed that when the calves 
became mother cows, Christensen lost all right to them, but since 
costs had been fully paid, Christensen claimed to own half. 
L. HORSES: Christensen bought seven (7) horses with Ranch Account 
funds, five (5) of which were resold with sufficient profit to pay 
for all of them. Of the two ( 2) kept, Abbott took one ( 1) and 
Christensen kept a registered mare, which in 1974 he paid to have 
bred to a registered stud. 
II. DISSOLUTION PERIOD: 
A. SUMMER OF 1974: During the summer of 1974, the parties 
determined to terminate their joint venture. The parties had 
relatively little trouble agreeing how the real property would be 
divided, Christensen testified that other joint venture assets 
were also divided, with each receiving what came with their parcel, 
except on the Reary Place as explained hereafter. Abbott testified 
to the contraryr claiming that all personal property, hay, 
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livestock, etc., were his. 
B. TERMINATION DATE: Despite a conflict of testimony, the triai , 
court adopted November, 1974 as the termination date, that beina• 
'I 
the last month Christensen received a monthly draw of $500.00. (See I 
Finding of Fact lt2, Record, Pg. 153, Case No. 5799). 
C. REAL PROPERTY TO ABBOTT: Under the agreement reached by the 
parties, Abbott. received by contract or otherwise: 
1. Reary Place: All oil, 
connected with this parcel, 
gravel bed; 
gas and mineral rights 
plus one-half ( 1/2) of the 
2. Bleazard Place: All interest of the parties; 
3. Taylor Place: All interest of the parties; 
4. Whitehead Place: All interest of the parties. 
D. REAL PROPERTY TO CHRISTENSEN: Under the agreement reached by 
the parties, Christensen received by contract or otherwise: 
1. Reary J?lace: All interest, except for the oil, gas 
and mineral rights, and one-half (1/2) of the gravel bed; 
[Exhibit It 14.] 
2. Birch!_!.. and E= All interest; [Exhibit lt17.] 
3. Lindsay Place: All interest. [Exhibit lt26.] 
E. OTHER PROPERTY: Each party initially retained certain personal 
property, including farm machinery, livestock, horses, etc., that 
they either had, or, that went with the place they received, or, 
which they had agreed upon between them. 
III. PERIOD AFTER rrERMINATION: 
A. FIRST YEAR ::. 1975. 
1. Abbott's Cattle. _During the first six (6) months of 
1915
' 
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5, 
Christensen continued to "run", care for, etc., Abbott's "mother 
cows", feeding them hay he had purchased from third parties or 
which had been raised on the property he received or "purchased" 
under the distribution. Christensen claimed the right to be 
reimbursed for this hay and effort. Abbott claimed Christensen was 
to feed the cattle as part of the termination agreement. Abbott 
took possession of his "mother cows• by August of 1975. 
2. 1973 Calf Crop: Early in 1975, the fifty-eight (58) head 
of cows that had been the 1973 "hold-over" calf crop, were divided, 
each receiving half. 
rest. 
Abbott made no demand at the time for the 
3. Water on Reary Place: During 1975, Abbott made no claim to 
the 424 shares of water from the Reary Place, and Christensen used 
them as he had since 1971. 
4. Lindsay Place Livestock: Christensen personally retained, 
used, cared -for -and--sold-1-ivestock acquired ~it-h -the -Lindsay-Place, 
and Abbott made no protests. 
5. Property Division: Each party operated his own ranch 
property throughout 1975~ Abbott failed to set up of any of the 
escrows called for on pgs. 1 and 2 of Exhibits i14 and i26. (Also 
See Abbott's Answer, Record, pg 13, Paragraph 8, Case No. 6169.) 
6. Miscellaneous Ranch Property: Christensen had possession 
and use of a registered quarter horse mare that·· he considered to be 
h~s share of the "profits• from horses. In 1974 Christensen paid a 
$100.0Q "breed fee", receiving a colt in 1975, and in 1975 paid 
another "breed fee" for another colt. 
7. Joint Venture Debt: During early 1975, Christensen 
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• 
received statements for unpaid expenses incurred by the ranch . 
~ 
to termination, which he gave to Abbott. 
pay them, Christensen personally paid the same. All of thi 
information was furnished to, and considered by, the special 
master. 
B. LITIGATION BEGINS - 1976: 
---
1. 1973 Calf Crop: While the calving was going on, Abbot: 
still made no demand or suggestion that he considered these to be 
"his" cows. However, other business arrangements between Abbot' 
and Christensen's father, Paul Christensen also terminated in April 
of 1976. On June 11, Abbott filed Case No. 5799, claiming tha: 
Christensen was wrongfully withholding Abbott's cattle anj 
-replevying the same. 
2. Reary Place and water: Christensen again had the full use! 
I 
of the property and all the water originally acquired with the! 
Reary Place. - In January Christensen suggested that Abbott shoulc 
enter into an Escrow Agreement, and deposit the necessary paper: 
{see Exhibit #B7), but Abbott made no attempt to do so as requirea 
in Exhibit #14. In November and December Christensen made the same 
request of Abbott. [See Exhibits #BB and #B9]. 
3. Lindsay Place: Christensen continued exclusive occupanci 
of the premises and possession of all the water, livestock ana 
other personal property originally acquired by the parties in 
connection with said property. On June 11, Abbott commenced case 
No. 5BOO, declaring Christensen had never paid the $29,000.00 down 
payment provided for in Exhibit #26. This was the first demana 
Abbott made upon Christensen for the $29,000.00. 
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Q, 
;e 
4. Christensen's Answer and Counterclaim: Christensen 
responded to both actions by: denying the same; requesting a full 
accounting; requesting the appointment of a Receiver; moving that 
the two actions be consolidated; etc. Abbott denied there was ever 
a partnership (see Abbott's deposition Pg. 35, lines 15-22, Record, 
pg. 62, Case No. 5799), and resisted the appointment of a Receiver, 
the consolidation of the cases, etc. 
5. Partnership Horses: Without notice to Christensen or any 
court order, Abbott took the registered mare and he~ yearling colt. 
The mare foaled after Abbott removed her. 
C. LITIGATION CONTINUES AND EXPANDS - 1977: 
----
Without notice or prior warning to Christensen, Abbott directed 
the officers of Farnsworth Cananl & Reservoir Company to remove the 
424 shares of water from the Reary Place. Christensen commenced 
Case No. 6169 and sought a Restraining Order. By reason of 
disqualification of Judges, reassignments, etc., no order was 
entered in 1977, and Abbott used the Reary water during 1977. In 
Paragraph No. 4 of Abbott's Answer, he alleges that he never 
intended "to include any water shares in the sale", (Record, Pgs. 
12 and 13, Case No. 6169), and that he had not entered into the 
~ow agreement, etc. (Paragraph No. 8, Record, Pg. 13, Case No. 
6169). 
As a result of the removal of the water during the 1977 
irrigation season, the pastures, hay fields, springs, wells, etc., 
on the Reary Place dried up; etc. As a result, Christensen 
sustained a substantial monetary loss. 
D. 1978 =. 1980: WATE_R RETURNED, TRIAL, ETC.: 
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Christensen obtained the re-delivery of the water to the R 
eary , 
place, and the accounting, discovery, etc., proceeded until the 
trial was held. 
ARGUMENT 
GENERAL STATEMENT 
Christensen concurs in the general statement of the law as 
indicated in Point 1 of Appellant's Brief, by underscoring several 
of the key points. 
1. The review of law and equity by the appellate court is in 
the light most favorable to the findings and judgment of the trial 
court. 
2. That the finding of the trial court, based on conflicting 
evidence, will not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that 
the court misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly against 
the weight of the evidence, Olinero ':!...:__ Elganti, 61 u. 475 at 479, 
214 P. 313 (1923); Ream':!...:__ Fitzen, 581 P. 2nd. 145, 147, (1978.) 
These standards for appellate review were carefully review~ ~ 
Hatch v. Bastain, Utah, 567 P.2d 1100 (1977), and this Court 
concluded: 
Even though we may review the evidence [in an equity 
case], the proposition is well grounded in our law, that 
due to the advantaged position of the trial court, ~ 
Tndulge COilsiderable difference to hiSf1narng5 and ¥e * 
interfere with them unless the evidence so c ~ar ~ 
preponderates against them that this court is convinc: 
that a manifest injustice has been done. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Based on such standards for review, Christensen believes that 
the court will not set aside those matters appealed from by Abbott, 
but will grant Christens.en relief from the certain portions of the 
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Findings made by the trial court. 
POINT I 
IN GENERAL, THE SPECIAL MASTER DID HIS JOB 
PROPERLY, AND AS DIRECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
While both parties felt that the special master had omitted 
items that they were concerned about, Abbott was not heard to 
protest any of the workings or activities of the special master, 
until after the trial. While Abbott may nnit pickn that the 
special master did not follow the nstipulationn, what should be 
referred to is the Order, which provides: 
That Sidney Gilbert be and is hereby appointed as a 
special master in this matter to review and audit all 
documents which he shall determine~is necessary, so as to 
fully reflect the joint operations of the parties ••• 
(emphasis added) Record, Pg. 64, Case No. 5799. 
With that authority, and the court's continuing jurisdiction to 
direct the special master, the work and report of the special 
master is proper. One of the functions of a special master in this 
type of situation, is to nsiftn through an unbelievable amount of 
records, so that the court can reach the ultimate decision it must 
make. As a matter of law, the court made a determination as to the 
terms of the partnership or joint venture arrangement, which the 
special master utilized to complete his report. 
No. 2, Record, Pgs. 153-154, Case No. 5799). 
(Finding. of Fact 
Abbott does not 
attack this finding by the court as not being the agreement of the 
parties. Rather, Abbott attempts to have .the trial court's finding 
that only Abbott was to contribute capital, be ignored because he 
claims such an arran'i!ement to be inequitable. Surely that is not 
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the function of either the trial or appellate court. The trial 
court's function was to determine, from the facts, what the parties 
had agreed to. Once the court made the finding that Abbott had the 
exclusive responsibility for making the capital contributions to 
the joint venture, then any expenses connected with his making a 
capital contribution, including interest, loan service fees, etc,, 
were his obligation and not expenses to be charged against the 
partnership, as far as the accounting is concerned. Likewise, ani 
contribution by Christensen would be in a different category. 
Thus, the complained of report and findings by the speeial master 
are correct, inasmuch as they conform to the findings made by the 
trial court. On appeal, Abbott might properly have attacked the 
court's finding as being against the weight of the evidence, etc.,. 
but not on the basis that such a term of an agreement was not wise. I 
POINT II 
PURCHASE OF ZANE CHRISTENSEN PROPERTY BY ABBOTT 
AND CHRISTENSEN WAS NEVER COMPLETED AND WAS NOT 
INTENDED AS ASSET OF THE VENTURE, TO BE DIVIDED 
The Trial Court correctly and specifically found: 
5. That the Zane Christensen Transaction was not a matter 
involved in any agreement which is the subject of 
1 itigation in this case. The evidence is insufficient to 
find any agreement as between the parties with reference 
thereto other than as setforth in the contract itself. 
(Record, Pg. 195, Case No. 5799). 
Utilizing the standard for appellate review, established on 
pages 9 and 10 of Abbott's brief, Christensen would urge that none 
of Abbott's points or arguments would suggest that the trial court 
. ht 
"misapplied the facts, or !llade Findings clearly against the weig 
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of the evidence." Nevertheless, Christensen responds to the points 
raised by Abbott. 
As indicated by Exhibit *79, which is the contract to purchase 
the Zane Christensen property by Abbott and Christensen, there was 
to be a $200,000.00 down payment. Abbott elected not to pay the 
full down payment. Instead, $50,000.00 was paid from the Ranch 
Account, and a $150,000.00 promissory note was given. On November 
20, 1974, Zane forfeited their interest as buyers. (Exhibit *20). 
Inasmuch as that occurred, Abbott and Christensen did not have a 
viable or meaningful contract which either of them could pursue. 
In fact, Zane Christensen was entitled to seek specific performance 
from them for the $150,000.00 due on the Promissory Note, but he 
did not. Apparently Zane treated the $50,000.00 paid to him more 
like "earnest money", which the parties forfeited by their failure 
to perform. 
On page 13 of his brief, Abbott underscores a "general rule 
applicable to dissolution in the case of a joint venture ••• in 
:he absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the person 
advancing capital is entitled to its return before there is a 
division of income or profit." (Emphasis· added) (46 Am. Jur. 2d 
56). Christensen agrees with that general principle, especially 
the underscored phrase, because it clearly points out that the 
parties can contract or agree contrary to the general rule. That 
is exactly what happened in the Abbott - Christensen, contract, a 
fact expressly found by the trial court. 
While Abbott claimed that Christensen contracted to purchase 
the Zane Christensen property from Abbott, Christensen denied such 
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a contract, alleging: the proferred one was fraudulent; heh:: 
never signed a contract; and if in fact the prof erred contract ha 
his signature, Abbott had substituted the signature page fro· 
another contract. Once Christensen denied the contract, or t 
having agreed to purchase the property, Abbott never re-opened th' 
subject. 
Again the thrust of the argument raised by Abbott, in Point 
III, Pg. 17 of his brief, is that the court should not only require 
the special master to redo the accounting, but that the court 
should ignore the terms of the agreement and rewrite the agreement 
more favorable to Abbott. Such is not the purpose of the courts, 
Abbott's claim on the Zane Christensen property is without merit. 
POINT III 
FROM THE BEGINNING, THE PARTNERSHIP OR 
JOINT VENTURE WAS AN EXPANDING SITUATION 
The original intention of the parties was to only split the 
profits from the sale of calves, since calves were the only thing 
they originally intended to "venture". However, as the areas of 
involvement expanded, so did the areas making a profit. Abbott 
acknowledged the same when he said: 
"These things changed from time to time as our situation 
changed." (Deposition of Abbott, Pg. 6, lines 5 and 6, 
Record, Pg. 62, Case No. 5799.) 
Realizing there would be very few calves to sell the first year, 
the venture purchased 100+ head of Winterton calves. Abbott has 
never accounted to Christensen for these calves, and the trial 
court did not require the_ special master to consider them. 
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will be discussed hereafter. Thereafter, the parties acquired 
other livestock, real estate, etc., all of which meant more work 
and responsibility for Christensen. With each new acquisition 
Christensen could have insisted on the terms of the original 
agreement by only taking care of "mother cows." However, the joint 
venture was mutually expanded to divide profits from all efforts, 
while Abbott remained responsible for contributing the necessary 
capital. The trial court was correct in directing the special 
master to include all of the items that were included. The error 
is not in including too many items, but in not including enough 
items, as indicated hereafter. 
Abbott simply has not met the appellant's burden to obtain a 
reversal, for his objection to the special master having made 
certain Findings as being contrary to the stipulation, is negated 
by the terms of the "Order" appointing the speciil master and those 
findings are supported by the preponderance of the evidence, etc. 
POINT IV 
LOSSES OF THE JOINT OPERATION BELONG TO ABBOTT. 
The terms of the joint venture were clearly found by the trial 
court, (Finding of Fact No. 2, Record, Pg. 154, Case No. 5799). 
Since Abbott had the duty to provide the capital, and to guarantee 
'Christensen a base amount, then the only logical conclusion the 
court could reach, was that the parties had agreed that the losses, 
if any, would be Abbott's. For it to be otherwise would mean 
Christensen only had a monthly draw, and not a guarantee. Further, 
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the Finding and Conclusion reached 1 by the trial court supports that' 
principle of law that parties can contract to do anything that i: 
not illegal, as Abbott indicates in Point V, Pg. 21 of his brief:' 
"A joint ventu.re should remain joint whether it results in 
a gain or in a l?ss, unless the parties contract 
otherwise. (E".1phasis added). Producers LIVe5t0Ck 
Marketing v. Christensen, Utah, 588 P.2d 156, [1978], at 
page 158. -
In all the documents and materials produced by Abbott, not once 
did he produce, as was requested, partnership tax returns showing 
tl)e profits and losses, tax credits, etc. It is to be presumed 
that Abbott accepted the full benefit of the partnership losses for 
tax benefits, but apparently is unwilling to give Christensen the, 
benefits of the profits. 
I 
POINT V i 
THE REPLEVIED cows WERE CHRISTENSEN'S I 
I 
When the property was divided between the parties, each, 
received half of the "grown up" 1973 calves. However, Abbott has 
developed a unique "logic", which, is to the effect that inasmuch 
as Christensen was not to own Abbott's "mother cows", there was 
this sudden and mystical transformation of ownership. With logic 
suitable for a fantasy, Abbott claims that since Christensen 
delayed disposing of his interest until, by the magic of nature, 
t_tiey had become "mother cows", that Christensen had lost all 
ownership in them, and Abbott was the benefactor of this wonderous 
event of nature. Abbott's share of the 1973 calf crop doubled, 
while Christensen's simply dissappeared. While this may be an 
f bb tt ' · · i't i's the log1'c Abbott is overstatement o A o s _position, 
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I 
----
advocating. Christensen would suggest it doesn't really matter 
that these calves became mother cows, that as the prof it from the 
1973 calf crop, Christensen owned half of them. 
Abbott's arguments on Page 23 of his brief are actually 
inconsistent. The brief refers to page 88 of the Transcript where 
Abbott testified that all of the 1973 calves belonged to him 
because they had matured to "mother cows". Then in a sweep of 
reasoning that would "bound tall buildings" the brief refers to 
page 89 of the Transcript where Abbott testifies that he gave 
Christensen credit for the 1973 calf crop at termination. Why 
would Abbott give Christensen credit at termination if Abbott truly 
believed that the calves were Abbott's because of their change into 
mother cows? Al though requested, Abbott failed to indicate in any 
manner or form, i.e., how or for what, Christensen received credit 
for his share of the calves. The special master was unable to find 
any record of any such credit, so the court ordered Abbott to pay 
Christensen the value of those replevied "grown up" calves. 
POINT VI 
VALUE OF THE DISTRIBUTED PROPERTY 
Abbott spends a considerable amount of his brief, starting on 
page 24, under Point VI, concerning his after-the-fact valuation of 
the properties. However, his valuations are so preposterous as to 
not be believable~ were not founded in any written nor verbal 
agreement between the parties~ were ignored by the trial court~ and 
"fly" in the face of the fact that the parties agreed between 
themselves, at lea.st - on the property Christensen received, as to 
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the value they placed on the property, 
"fully integrated contracts." 
by reducing the same to, 
I 
Judge Bullock tried to make that poi' nt at th t · 1 e ria in this 
exchange: 
THE COURT: What do you claim for the value? 
MR HURD: It's simply, if your Honor please, to show what 
these respective parties got out of this property, out of 
this endeavor. 
THE COURT: I don't know whether -- Maybe it's supposed to 
show that there was some kind of an equitable division. But 
I don't know that that makes any difference. Either there 
was a division or there wasn't, or an an agreement with 
respect to it, equitable or inequitable. And I think it 
might be important if .!. had to make an agreement between the 
parties, but .!_ can't do that as ~ matter of law. You know 
that. 
MR MANGAN: Correct. 
MR. HURD: Well, it's our position that the agreement was 
made between the parties. 
THE COURT: That's right. So what difference is it going 
to make, unless you are going to try to set it aside on the 
grounds that it was inconsconsionable [sic 
unconsconionable?], or something of that nature, which I 
haven't heard anybody say? 
(Transcript, pg. 515, lines 
added. 
through 2 1.) Emphasis 
The trial court thus dismissed further discussion of the 
subject. However, to illustrate the lack of believabiliey cl 
Abbott's valuations, Abbott testified that in the Zane Christensen 
contract, in which Zane had forfeited their buyers interest some 
six (6) years earlier, that the parties still had an equity of 
"'$172,000.00 in the land, which equity Christensen was the 
benefactor of. (See Exhibit ll81 and Table II, Page 25 of Abbott's 
Brief. ) While that arrount is impressive, the logic or reasoning l:ehiri 
it is vecy difficult to swallCM. The sane is true with Abbott's valuatio!IS 
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the Birch places, the Reary place, etc. The fact is, as the trial 
court indicated, that Christensen and Abbott reached a specific 
agreement between them, both as to the division of the property and 
to the valuation of the Reary and Lindsay places, by executing 
Exhibits #14 and #25. Further, Abb_ott's self-serving schedules or 
tables fail to reflect all matters which. he testified to. For 
example, he admits in Table I, Page 24, that Christensen had an 
equity in the Lindsay place of at least $30,824.00. Yet at the 
same time he testified in Case No. 5800 that Christensen had not 
paid the down payment of the $29,000.00. Unless Christensen had 
made the down payment, then he had no equity in the Lindsay Place. 
However, when you consider the purchase price _as $100,000.00, and 
deduct the unpaid balance due to Lindsay of $69,176.00, there is an 
equity of $30,824.00 which Abbott admits Christensen was to 
receive. However, if Abbott prevails on his claim that Christensen 
was to pay Abbott $29,000.00 in addition, then Christensen received 
only $1,824.00 in equity, and not the $30,824.00 that Abbott 
acknowledged that Christensen received. Perhaps these figures help 
to serve the old addage that "Figures don't lie!" or is it that 
"Liars don't figure?" 
Inadvertently, or otherwise, Abbott in his attempt to inflate 
the value of the equities distributed to Christensen, has admitted 
that Christensen does not owe the $29,000.00. While the matter of 
the down payment on the Lindsay place' will be covered again 
hereafter, Christensen does assert that the above is further 
evidence of the need for partial reversal of that part of the 
Judgment by the triaL court. 
Page - 23 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT VII 
THE AWARD TO CHRISTENSEN FOR THE CARE 
OF ABBOTT'S COWS, WAS JUST AND EQUITABLE 
There is no dispute that Christensen cared for and fed Abbott's 
cattle after the termination. Once the joint venture was 
terminated, there was no justification, consideration, or reason 
for Christensen to continue to feed or care for Abbott's cattle 
without Abbott compensating Christensen accordingly. While Abbott 
testifed that Christensen agreed to do this act as part of the 
termination, Christensen denied that claim, and Aboott had no 
evidence of any consideration given by Abbott to Christensen in 
exchange for this service, etc. Contrary to Abbott's declaration 
that the settlement was "generous" on the part of Abbott toward 
Christensen, there is no evidence to support the same. Abbott 
argues that inasmuch as Christensen fed Abbott's cattle hay that 
had been raised in 1974 on the joint venture property, that Abbott 
was entitled to that hay without cost. Abbott seems to ignore the 
fact that all the hay that the joint venture raised on the property 
he kept, i.e., Bleazard and Whitehead, was considered "his" hay and 
that he had and used it exclusively. Yet Abbott disapproves of the 
court's conclusion that the hay raised on the places that 
Christensen received was Christensen's exclusive property. Once 
the parties had terminated their joint venture,' and the properties 
· · d h · h d f th 1 · to anyth1' ng produced were divide , C ristensen a no ur er c aim 
off of those properties received by Abbott and vice versa. Because 
Christensen elected to feed- Abbott's cattle hay he acquired in the 
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termination, rather than to buy other hay, is no defense to 
Abbott's obligation to pay Christensen the reasonable value of the 
hay. If the parties had really intended for Abbott to retain all 
of the hay at termination, then while Abbott was preparing and 
typing all of the contracts, he should have so provided. 
The court and the special master had ample evidence upon which 
they could determine or assess the value of the feed and feeding of 
Abbott's cattle. Not only did Christensen testify, but Fausett, a 
well known rancher in the area, who annually is responsible for 
feeding thousands of cattle in similiar circumstances and in herds 
larger and smaller than that of Abbott's, also testified. 
Fausett's expert opinion considered the feed given, the location of 
the herd, and the other circumstances that were involved. The 
court used that opinion in reaching its conclusion. Abbott makes 
no argument that reasonable men couldn't reach th~ same opinion; or 
that the court's finding was ag~inst the weight of the evidence; or 
that the Court's Findings met that criteria necessary for reversal. 
Whether Abbott likes, the trial court made an express finding 
of the ownership of the hay Christensen fed, and Abbott is not 
entitled to insist upon a credit. Further, Christensen's testimony 
is being rniscontrued by Abbott, wherein he insists that Christensen 
only anticipated being paid $500.00 per month for feeding Abbott's 
cattle. Previously Christensen had been guaranteed. $500.00 a 
month, ~ £ place- to live, plus beef, plus one-half (1/2) of the 
Profits, etc. Christensen anticipated that he would be compensated 
in some similar manner-for feeding Abbott's cattle, after the joint 
venture ended, and not that he would merely receive $5·00.00 per 
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month. The ruling of the trial court was correct and · supported b; 
1 
the preponderance of the evidence. 
POINT VIII 
CHRISTENSEN IS ENTITLED TO THE 424 SHARES 
OF FARNSWORTH IRRIGATION CANAL WATER STOCK. 
In 1971, the Reary Place was purchased for $52,000.00, which 
included 240 acres of land, 424 shares of water, 30 acres of 
mineral rights and farm equipment. Christensen agreed to pay 
Abbott the same price for the Reary Place that Abbott had paid, 
plus the interest Abbott had paid. As further compensation, Abbott 
retained all mineral rights, and half interest in a gravel pit. 
Abbott typed and prepared the contract, Exhibit *14. Intentional 
or unintentional, the 424 shares of water were omitted from the 
term "PROPERTY PURCHASED". Thereafter the paragraph entitled 
"ABSTRACT OF TITLE, WARRANTY DEED, ETC." (page 2) specifically 
specifies a water certificate would be included. In the paragraph 
entitled "POSSESSION, TIME OF ESSENCE, GRACE & DEFAULT:" the 
contract requires Christensen "to pay the taxes or water 
assessments on the said property, n and the paragraph entitled 
"'.l!!AXES:" requires Christensen to "pay all taxes and assessments 
thereafter. .. It was established that Abbott considered 
°Christensen a "wizard" with water and that Christensen kept the 
Reary Place well irrigated. If the irrigation water was Jiemoved 
from the Reary Place, it would loose all farmable value, which for 
a farm would be a "waste." In the contract, under the paragraph 
entitled "COVENANTS:" Abbott required Christensen to covenant 'not 
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~ any waste on said premises or permit any waste to be 
committed 
chr is tensen in an 
n Without any water, this covenant would place 
untenable position of not being able to avoid 
causing "waste" to the place. 
The 424 shares of water remained with the Reary place for the 
1975 and 1976 seasons. Abbott made no demand or indication that he 
intended to transfer or use the water anywhere else. No escrow was 
signed, and no water certificate was escrowed. In January, 1976, 
Christensen suggested to Abbott that an escrow be entered into (see 
Exhibit #87), but Abbott did not reply. Then in June, litigation 
arose in form of a replevy of the cattle and for the $29,000.00 
down payment, and Christensen demanded an accounting. In November 
and December, 1976, Christensen again requested Abbott to enter 
into escrow and to escrow the necessary documents, (see Exhibits 
#BB and #89), but Abbott refused by not responding. In April 1977, 
Abbott removed the 424 shares of water off the Reary place- and 
Christensen commenced Case 6169. Abbott responded by alleging that 
"no water shares" were intended to be included with the Reary 
Place. [See Abbott's Answer, paragraph 4, Record, Pgs. 12 and 13, 
Case No. 6 169. ] 
During 1977, Abbott used the 424 shares on his property. In 
1978, Christensen had the water returned to the Reary Place where 
it has remained. On February 20, 1979, Abbott and_ h.is wife, 
unilaterally executed, an Escrow Agreement with First Security Bank 
Of Utah, N.A. (See Exhibit 144). Rather than deliver a •water 
certificate" for 424 shares of Farnsworth Irrigation and Canal Co., 
r,bbott delivered a .'.'Bill of Sale• for 30 shares in the same 
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~ 
I 
I 
I 
company. Abbott has yet to tender a water certificate into escrow, I 
Why a Bill of Sale for only 30 shares was tendered is a complete ' 
mystery, especially since in his Answer Abbott claims that ~water 
was to be included. At the trial and in his brief, Abbott stresses 
that Christensen allegedly had other water shares that he could 
call upon, including 1964 shares from the forfeited property of 
Zane Christensen. Th is logic by Abbott "boggles" the mind of 
reasonable men. 
In a land where water is very limited, and thus very valuable, 
no one buys farmland without purchasing the water shares 
appurtenant to or used with the land, for to do such would render 
the property almost without value. Indeed, it was Christensen's 
testimony that he would not have purchased the ranch if it had not 
been expressly agreed that the 424 shares were included in the 
purchase. These facts are driven home by the events which occITT~d 
in 1977, when Abbott removed the water. Not only did the crops and 
pastures die, but the springs dried up which provided culinary 
water for the house. There wasn't even enough water in the wells 
to flush the toilet. That is why Abbott was able to acquire the 
160 acre Taylor Place for $16,000.00, and why it is ridiculous to 
assume that without a full water right, the Reary place would not 
be selling for over $56,000.00. If, as Abbott urges, Christensen 
was to remove the water that he theoretically had on the other 
places, then those locations would have been reduced in valu.e to 
dry land ranches and could not have had the "high" value that is 
ascribed to them by Abbott. If Christensen did not or could not 
move other water to the Reary Place, as is urged by Abbott, then 
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the Reary Place was of very little value. 
Title 73-1-11 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
prov ides: 
...• a right to the use of water appurtenant to land shall 
pass to the grantee of such land, unless expressly 
reserved by the Grantor. (emphasis added) 
under this section, the Utah courts have held that a deed to land 
in statutory form, conveys whatever right the grantor has to the 
water appurtenant to the land, unless the grantor expressly 
reserves that appurtenant water. Bower ~ Prestwich, 578 P.2d, 
1283 (1978); Roberts~ Roberts, 584 P.2d 378 (1978). Cortella ~ 
Salt Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 72 P.2d 630 (1938). The courts have 
defined water appurtenant to a tract of land as that amount which 
was beneficially used upon it before and at the time of conveyance. 
Stevens v. Burton, 546 P.2d 240 (Utah, 1976). Therefore, it is 
well settled in this jurisdiction-that a deed or a contract, which 
does not contain an express reservation of water, conveys whatever 
rights the grantor had at the time of the conveyance. There is no 
dispute that historically the 424 shares of, water had been used on 
the Reary place; that Abbott acquired that number of shares in 1971 
when he contracted to purchase the same from Reary; that Abbott had 
mortgaged the 424 shares, with the Reary property to Equitable Life 
Assurance co.; and that Christensen used all 424 shares from 1971 
through 1976r on the Reary place. In E!Chibi t i 14, any express 
reservation by Abbott of the water rights is conspicuously absent, 
while he expressly retained all of the mineral rights and one-half 
(1/2) of the gravel and fill dirt. Surely~ if Abbott had intended 
to reserve the water rights, he would have expressly reserved them 
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as he did the mineral rights. Indeed, the inclusion of the tern, 
"water certificate" as a doucment to be escrowed, coupled with the 
requirement that Christensen was to pay all water assessments, 
gives a clear indication that the parties intended water rights l9_ 
pass with land. 
As indicated above, Abbott's Answer claimed that since no water 
was described in "Property Sold," that no water was meant to be 
sold, despite references to water certificate, etc. This claim not 
only makes the entire contract confusing and/or uncertain, but 
conflicts with long established principles of contract law: 
An interpretation of an instrument which gives reasonable 
and effective meaning to all portions thereof is preferred 
to an interpretation which leaves part of the working of 
the instrument to no effect. Tyson v. Tyson, 61 Ariz. 
329, 149 P.2d 674 (1944). Kinterv=-wolf~Ariz. 164, 
426 P.2d 798 (1967). (Emphasis added.-)~-
In interpreting plans, specifications and provisions which 
formed part of contract, the court must reconcile 
provisions, if reasonably possible, so as to give effect 
to all and to construe complete contract to carry out its 
dOminant purpose; and if two interpretations were 
possible, one of which would lead to confusion, 
uncertainty or elimination of one of essential parts of 
the contract and one which would harmonize all provisions 
of the writings and make the contract complete, fair and 
usual, the latter interpretation would be preferred. 
Vance v. Arnold, 201 P.2d 475, 114 Utah 463 (1949). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Abbott's interpretation of Exhibit #14 is such as to annul 
other plain parts thereof. The trial court's interpretation 
reconciles the terms of the contract, and carries out its dominant 
purpose. This court has never favored the result urged by Abbott. 
McBain v. Pratt, h (1973) 65 A.L.R. 3d 621: 514 P.2d 823, Uta ; 
Tyson, Vance op cit. 
If the terms of the c6ntract are doubtful or ambiguous, since 
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:e 
Abbott personally prepared the contract (Exhibit #14) and presented 
it to Christensen, then: 
Doubtful and ambiguous terms in the contract should be 
interpreted against the party who has chosen such terms 
• • Bryant v. Deseret News Pub. Co., 120 Utah 241, 233 
P.2d 355 (195l). 
Abbott's construction is also unreasonable since to sell the 
land without the water would render the property almost without 
value. The following contract principle is applicable. 
Where one interpretation would make a contract 
unreasonable and another construction equally consistent 
with the language would make it reasonable, the latter 
construction is the one which must be adopted. Cohn '!...!._ 
Cohn, 20 Cal. 2d 65, 123 P.2d 833 (1942). 
Christensen having farmed and irrigated the pl-ace from 1 ~71 
through 1974, would not reasonably be believed in November 1974, to 
have paid Abbott more for the land without water and mineral rights 
than Abbott paid for it with the water and mineral rights. Yet 
that is what Abbott would have the court believe. 
Christensen recognizes that not all water that is beneficially 
used upon land is conclusively presumed to be appurtenant to the 
land so as to pass in the absence of an express reservation by the 
grantor. Title 73-1-10, u.C.A., 1953 as amended, provides that: 
Water rights • shall be transferred by deed 
substantially in the same manner as real estate, except 
when they are represented by shares of stock in a 
corporation, in which case the water shall not be deemed 
to be appurtenant to the land. 
While this statute appears to make water represented by water 
stock to not be appurtenant to land, this Court, in interpreting 
the language of the statute, ruled that the effect of this statute 
was: 
• to establish ~ rebuttable presumptiow that a water 
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right represented by shares of stock in a corporation did 
not pass to the grantee as an appurtenance to the land 
upon which the water right was used, but that the 9ran~ 
could overcome such presumption if he could show ~ cleae 
and convincing evidence that said water right was in~ 
appurtenant and that the grantor intended to transfer the 
water right with the land, even though no express mention 
of any water right was made in the deed. Brimm v. cache 
Valley Banking Co., 2 Utah 2d 93, 269 P.2d 8sg:--(Empha815 
added). 
In the Brimm case supra, the water used upon the land wa: 
represented by water shares in an irrigation company. 
only, passed from the intestate owner of both the land an: 
irrigation stock, through various mesne convenances withou: 
specifically including the water shares in the transfer deeds. ~ 
appellant, as the intestate's heir, claimed that since the water 
shares were not included in the deeds of transfer that under tr,! 
statute they were legally severed from the land and were thu:' 
vested in the estate of the intestate. Respondent claimed th: 
water shares werE an appurtenance to the land and passed with it b'! 
mesne conveyance. Respondent's claim was supported by th1 
historical use of the water upon the property and the fact that th: 
land was worthless or of relatively little value without the water, 
The court held that: 
• • • whether the water right is an appurtenant to the 
stockholder's land is ~ question of fact in each ~! as 
is also whether on a sale of the land the water right 
passes as an appurtenance Brimm, supra, at 862. 
(emphasis added). 
When considering its historical use, the court gave great 
weight to the fact that: 
It was undisputed that a water right represented by stoc~ 
in an irrigation company was [historically] use 
upon the land and that the land was of little value 
without the right. Brimm, supra. 
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In determining the intent surrounding a conveyance of land and 
water used upon the land the court stated: 
• . . in the absence of any separate sale of the 
cert1f1cate or of any other evidence of any express 
intention to make~ severance, a sale of the land on which 
the water is. u~ed will carry the water right and a right 
to the cert1f1cate as an appurtenance. Brimm, supra. (emphasis added). ~~-
Thus a conveyance which did not contain an exoress reservation 
or severence of the water, conveyed whatever appurtenant water 
rights the grantor had at the time of the conveyance. In Brimm, 
the court ruled that: 1 ) the historical use of the water shares 
upon the land; 2) the worthlessness or little value of the 
property without the water; and, 3) the absence of any express 
intention to reserve or to separately sell the water shares, 
clearly and convincingly overcame the rebuttable presumption of 
Section 73-1-10. This Court held that the water stock was in fact 
appurtenant to the land and passed with the land in accordance with 
Section 7 3-1-11, and awarded the owner of the real property the 
title to the water shares. Likewise, in Abbott ~ Christensen, the 
water shares, were fourid by the trial court to be appurtenant to 
the land because: 1 ) the 424 shares have historically been used 
with the land; 2) the land is worthless or of little value without 
the water; and, 3) there is an absence of any express intention on 
the part of Abbott to reserve or separately sell the water shares. 
_Furthermore, the reasonable construction of the entire contract 
(Exhibit *14) would indicate an express intent for the water shares 
to go with the land as part of the entire transaction, and not to 
be retained by Abbott. In each case, whether the water right is 
appurtenant to the - land and was intended to pass on the sale, is ~ 
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question of fact. Brimm supra. 
From the preponderance of the ev1"d d "t ence an i s privileged 
position, the trial court found the necessary standards for 
overcoming the presumption that water represented by shares do not 
pass with the land. When one considers the totality of the 
situation, who the author of the contract was, and the other 
express language in that contract, it is more believable to presume 
that Abbott in typing the contract inadvertantly omitted reference 
to the 424 shares, than no intent to include water with the sale, 
Christensen urges that the trial court's Finding was correct, and 
should be affirmed. 
POINT IX 
THE LINDSAY CONTRACT IS ONE OF THE •FULLY 
INTEGRATED• CONTRACTS OF THE PARTIES 
Abbott's brief makes much of the fact that the court in its 
Finding Number 6, determined that the contracts (Exhibits #14 and 
126) were "fully intergrated." Christensen would respo~ ~ 
suggesting that said term has a variety of meanings. However, as 
Christensen understands the term, parol evidence may be used even 
with "fully integrated" contracts, to clarify an ambiguity, but~ 
to vary the terms of the contract. It is most interesting that 
Abbott would insist in connection with the Reary place, (Exhibit 
lt14), that no parol evidence is necessary since the contract is 
integrated, " though it is clear that it fails 
to 
"fully even 
specify the number of shares the water certificate will be for. 
However, on the Lindsay con.tract, (Exibit ll26) Abbott wishes to use 
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parol evidence to vary the written terms of the contract to 
establish that Christensen never paid the $29,000.00 down payment. 
The court allowed Abbott to use parol evidence to "explain" that 
alleged non-receipt of the down payment. This is most perplexing 
to Christensen since it was his understanding in the winding of the 
affairs of the joint venture, that the $29,00_0.00 down payment, as 
the contract recites, had been paid. There is nothing in the 
contract which is confusing, ambiguous, or such as to lead one to 
need parol evidence to establish anything to the contrary. It was 
signed by the parties including Abbott and delivered to 
Christensen, which delivery negated the necessity of any further 
receipts being issued. For nearly two (2) years Abbott seemed to 
be of the same opinion, since he made no demands upon Christensen 
for money, etc., that is, until this litigation was commenced. It 
is interesting to note that Abbott tactically admits Christensen's 
payment of the $29,000.00 in Table I on Pg. 24 of his Brief where 
he represents that at the time of the division of the properties, 
Christensen had an equity in the Lindsay Ranch in the amount of at 
least $30,824.00. This point was discussed in Point VI above. 
Without rehashing the same arguments, suffice it to say, if 
Christensen had not made the down payment, in some form to Abbott, 
then why would Abbott admit that Christensen had a $30,824.00 
~ in the property? Conversely, if Abbott was still to receive 
$29,000. 00 from Christensen, then why doesn't Abbott list that in 
his Exhibit #81, where he lists all that he was to receive from the 
ioint venture? 
Based on: the .clear terms of Exhibit #26~ the actions of 
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Abbott for two (2) years after Exhibit #26 was executed,· Abbott's 
admissions against interest; and, in the interest of justice, 
Christensen respectively requests the court to direct the trial, 
court to set aside the finding that Christensen is obligated top~ 
said $29,000.00 to Abbott, in any form. 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CHRISTENSEN 
CREDIT FOR THE $35,000.00 CONTRIBUTED FOR THE 
BLEAZARD PLACE, AND THE $45,000.00 HE HAD TO REPAY 
TO ZIONS BANK THAT WAS BORROWED FOR RANCH EXPENSES 
As indicated in the statement of facts, at the time the 
Bleazard place was acquired, Abbott did not have the financial 
means to "swing" the deal. Christensen made available $35,000,00 
in the form of his home and mineral rights. Those contributions 
were clearly established. In addition, Christensen as co-signer of I 
the $90,000.00 note at Zions First National Bank, the proceeds of 
which were deposited to the Ranch Account, had to assume one-half 
or $45,000.00 of the same when the joint venture ended. Jl.bbott 
insisted on that result in his letter to Zions First National Bank 
(see Exhibit i32, page 2). The bank officals and Christensen 
The testified that the money was borrowed for "ranch expenses". 
notes of Zions First National Bank's loan officer on the date the 
1 . t' d M 17 1974 i'nd1'cates that the loan was app ica ion was ma e on ay , , 
"for operating expense until sell of calves in fall." (See Exhibit 
i32, pg. 9. ) Abbott testified the money was borrowed for 
Christensen's father, Paul Christensen, to use in a venture known 
as "Blue Mountain." Tha-t venture was 
not part of this joint 
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venture; _this Christensen was not a party to that proceeding; and, 
that proceeding has been litigated, appealed, remanded, re-
litigated, and now back before this court for further 
consideration. In no manner or form, is the $45,000.00 obligation 
assumed by this Christensen, any p_art of that litigation. This 
trial court held that the Blue Mountain venture would not be 
included in this litigation, and with that conclusion, this 
Christensen heartily agreed. ·However, this Christensen could not 
understand the failure of this trial court to give this Christensen 
credit for the $45,000.00 he contributed to this joint venture, for 
"ranch expenses", regardless of where Abbott spent the same. 
Abbott and Christensen represented to Zions First National Bank 
that the loan would be repaid from "sale of calves. in"~t.he ·fall." 
(See Exhibit #32, pg. 9). That was not done, and each party repaid 
$45,000.00 to the bank. However, under the terms of the agreement 
as expressly found by the trial court, Christensen should not have 
assumed any part of that note. 
without credit? 
Why then is he forced to, and 
While the reality and actuality of the contributions made by 
Christensen are well established, credit for the same cannot be 
found in any of the accountings by the court or· the special master. 
It seems unconscionable that the court would fail to give 
Christensen credit for this total of $80·,000.00 in contributions, 
while requiring him to pay $29,000.00 to Abbott. Such a result is 
unconscionable and adds insult to injury. The net result is that 
Christensen is judicially required to contribute $109,000.00 to 
Abbott, which Christ€nsen had no obligation to make and for which 
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he receives nothing! Christensen would respectively request tn! 
court to over-rule the trial court by finding that Christensen 
entitled to a credit for both the $35,000.00 and the $45,oooo.o~, 
in his claims against Abbott, and to direct the special master to 
adjust his report and accounting accordingly. 
POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT NEGLECTED TO GIVE CHRISTENSEN 
CREDIT FOR ALL GAINS REALIZED BY THE PARTNERSHIP 
Christensen acquired for the joint venture, livestock, realty, 
personal property, etc., which were sold at an enhanced value. fu 
first of these were the Winterton calves. While Abbott denied that 
Christensen was to share in any of the profits, it does not seei 
logical or consistent to believe that that would be the intent ol 
I 
the parties. Under the original agreement, Christensen was on!( 
: 
going to receive one-half (1/2) the profit from the calf crop, but 
that is because that was initially all the parties were going to 
joint venture. When that initial agreement was expanded, 
Christensen was entitled to the benefit of the expansion. It is 
interesting to note that Abbott wants to have a full accounting of 
all "losses" that might have occurred in the partnership 
arrangement, but he is unwilling to make an accounting as to all 01 
the "profits" that the partnership made. This is further evidence 
of the problems the parties had between them. What Abbott suggests 
is just another way of saying "what's mine is mine, and what's 
yours is mine tool" 
Abbott's · i's ent i' rely contrary to conduct towards Christensen 
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that standard demanded of him as a fiduciary in a partnership. 
u.c.A. 48-1-18 ( 1953i. In such a relationship, each partner must 
act in the highest good faith towards the co-partner in the conduct 
of the partnership, and may not obtain any advantage over his co-
partner in partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation 
or concealment. Vai ~ Bank of America National Trust and Savings 
~·• 56 Cal. 2d 329, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 364 P.2d 247 (1961). 
This good faith and fair dealing require that neither party to the 
division of prof its be permitted to take unfair advantage or enjoy 
greater rights than the terms of the agreement call for_. One of 
them may not obtain undue profit, and one entrusted with another's 
rights and interests is• charged with a duty to guard such rights 
with the utmost good faith. Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 177 
P.2d 931 (1947). 
In particular, Christensen is aggrieved .by the failure to 
properly divide the horses that Christensen has purchased with 
partnership profits. Christensen bought seven (7) horses through 
the ranch account, of which five (5) were sold for enough to 
completely pay the purchase price of all. the horses and since all 
other expenses were then paid, Abbott claimed one horse and 
Christensen claimed a mare. From 1974 until in 1976-1977, 
Christensen retained this mare, had her bred twice, personally 
paying both breed fees. In 1976, the mare had a yea-rling colt and 
was again pregnant. Abbott removed said mare and colt from 
Christensen's land, without Christensen's knowledge or .. approval. ,. 
The court indicating that it had had more important things on its 
mind, admitted that it had not made notes on the mare, so for lack 
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of evidence, allowed Abbott to retain the mare, a d b th n 0 Of h;: 
colts, without even having to pay the breeding fees. That not on) 
effectively denied Christensen the beneifit of the "profit" of th' 
horse transaction, but it cost him a few hundred bucks to boot, 
Such a result is contrary to the agreement of the parties, and tc 
equity. 
Likewise, the same kind of result is allowed by reason of th' 
failure of the trial court's refusal to require Abbott to account 
to Christensen for one-half ( 1/2) of the profits derived from the 
Winterton heifers. What the court has done, is to allow the 
parties to expand the scope of their joint venture, but tc 
judicially limit the extent of the "profits" that were to be 
divided. Thus the parties could agree that Christensen's duties 
and responsibilities could be expanded, but judicially Christensen 
is esstopped from being compensated for the same. 
POINT XII 
CHRISTENSEN IS ENTITLED TO AWARD 
OF A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE AND COSTS 
Abbott's removal of the irrigation water from the "Reary PlK~ 
was a violation of Exhibit !114 and Christensen should have at least 
been awarded a reasonable attorney's fee for that portion of his 
attorney's time spent in having the same restored to the Reary 
place. The Finding by the Trial Court that the 424 shares of water 
were to go with the Reary place, made Christensen in Case No. 61691 
the "prevailing party", 
. · as beino 
and established that lit1gat1on 
necessary. Under the tri-al 
was al5·.' 
court's ruling, Christensen 
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the "prevailing party" for the replevied cows, while Abbott was on 
the down payment. However, when the entire account was made, 
Abbott still owed Christensen a net of $47,663.79. In substance, 
that made Christensen the "prevailing party" in all the actions. 
As the prevailing party, Christensen should be given the benefit of 
the bargained for remedy of a reasonable attorneys fee "in the 
event of default or failure of either of the parties hereto in the 
performance of the covenants herein in- this contract imposed upon 
either of said parties " 
Not only were the water shares involved, but the necessity of 
getting Abbott to escrow was involved. Despite 3 letters 
requesting the same in 1976, Abbott refused to do so. After two 
years of litigation, Abbott made a partial attempt to comply with 
the terms of the contract by escrowing a Bill of Sale for 30 
shares, but did not deposit a water certificate or any document 
assigning the proper number of shares, etc. Reasonable people 
should conclude that it was necessary for Christensen to bring Case 
No. 6169, and to counter sue, in order to secure Abbott's 
performance. Christensen should have been awarded his attorney's 
fees and all of his costs, as is also provided for in said 
contract. In fact, the totality of Abbott's claims and defenses 
appear to suggest a lack of good faith, and justification for the 
award of an attorney's fee, at least on appeal, under 78-27-56, 
U.C.A., ( 1953 as amended). 
In determining what is a reasonable attorney's fee, the court 
must consider the time and effort expended, the complexity of the 
case, etc. In that-regard, in order to even secure the temporary 
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return of the water during the pendency of this act1'o n, numerou1 
hours of work were required; at least two (2) appearances, and thu; 
travel from Roosevelt to appear before the court in Provo were 
required; as well as the preparation of pleadings, discovery, 
posting of undertakings, research, briefing, trial preparation, 
etc. At the trial, counsel for Christensen proferred that he haa 
then spent over 450 hours on the three cases, and that he 
attributed at least 1 50 to case no. 6169, and that a fair ana 
reasonable rate of compensation for his time would be $60.00 per 
hour. No evidence was proferred by Abbott to the contrary, 
Considering all factors, $9,000.00 would not have been an 
unreasonable sum for the court to award up to the trial for eacn 
case, and an additional reasonable amount should also be awarded on' 
appeal. Christensen requests this court to remand the matter for 
the award of a reasonable attorney's fee, both for the original 
trial and on appeal, under the terms of the contract, and Title Ji· 
27-56, U.C.A. 
CONCLUSION 
Christensen hereby requests the court to affirm the matters 
appealed from by Abbott herein, and to remand the matters to the 
trial court, with the following directions: 
1. To direct the trial court to hold that the $29,000.00 down 
payment on the Lindsay place has been paid; 
2. Christensen is entitled to receive a credit for the 
$35,000.00 in property that he contributed for Abbott on the 
Bleazard place, plus $45,.000.00 the Portl'on of th' in credit for 
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Ranch Expense loan that he assumed at Zions Bank at the time the 
joint venture terminated; 
3. Christensen receive a full accounting and benefit of one-
half (1/2) of the Winterton calves, plus the return of the mare and 
her two colts; and 
4. Christensen as the "prevailing party" be awarded a 
reasonable attorney's fee and his costs, both for the original 
actions and on appeal. 
Respectively cubmitted this 
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